Whether HDP exceeds the threshold or not….
It's possible to approach the “which one of them is preferable” question from two aspects.
The first one is clear; democratically and principally, it's unpreferable for any political party, who has representative power, especially a party, who carries the Kurdish issue, to be below the threshold.
Secondly; it's related with political realities. There are many people who ask themselves the following question; Will HDP's success in exceeding the threshold or not effect Turkey's progress towards democracy and consistency?
The hopelessness in the opposition side is pushing the segment outside HDP's traditional voters towards HDP. Etyen Mahçupyan's projection in his “Sunni issue” article was remarkable:
“When we think that the attendance in the elections will be 85-90%, HDP requires 4.7 million votes to exceed the threshold. The surveys show that, the support is around 3.8 million nowadays and it will go up to 4.7 million with the votes from residents outside the country….”
Etyen is saying that closing the gap is directly related with the Alevi voters' attitudes. It's necessary to approach the matter beyond Alevi voters. Because, many urbanized CHP voters, who regard HPD as a more active opposition that will at least prevent Erdoğan, will be pushing HDP. The factors, who will be increasing HDP's votes around 40%, will carry a certain importance, even if HDP exceeds the threshold or not, and form a serious aspect of the political mood of Turkey in the forthcoming period. Then, what are the factors that provide an increase in HDP's votes?
Naturally, they factors are “the CHP issue, or in other words, “the opposition deficiency”, “the tension and fatigue that is created by the dominant party regime and rulership tone” and “the existence of the resolution process”, which is as important as the previous ones.
In the same rate, the resolution process slackened the tension, made a resolution over conversation and reconciliation, and made the new Turkey hope possible: it carried HDP within the system.
This process also made HDP's Turkishness claim meaningful.
Then, the possibilities after the elections…
There are two burdens on HDP; the Kurdish issue and the Turkishness matter…
The actual matter is; how these will be associated.
If HDP exceeds the threshold, will HDP continue to move on in this direction? Will HDP fulfill the requirement of being a party of Turkey, by stepping beyond being a variable dependent on the Kurdish issue, and give due for the new votes they receive?
If they can; then without a doubt, the country will be expecting positive developments from the point of making a new constitution, democratic consent and deepening of the resolution process.
However, this is a difficult task and it's just a possibility.
It's possible for the Kurdish movement to raise the bar by forcing the system and impose their conditions, deepen some parallel formations in the southeast, and place their strategy on a new power factor over their success in elections.
As a matter of fact, a non-HDP parliamentarian that we've spoken to on the phone yesterday, was telling us in details about how the heavy oppression and threat of the organization in the southeast does not allow the catching of breath. There is no doubt that this oppression exceeds the caliber of HDP. Even this situation carries the structural clues of an issue related with tomorrow.
This type of negative possibility, if AK Party's, especially Tayyip Erdoğan's, stance and view is taken into consideration, might drag Turkey towards a crisis that will make us long for today.
On the contrary, in the case that HDP fails to exceed the threshold, we don't think that disengagement will be experienced in the resolution process as claimed by some people. However, there will be a problem. Within this context, the deactivation of chosen actors that represent the Kurdish movement and the impairing of this by AK Party, as they perceive this result as a support for their own paradigm, are both clear risks.
Outside the resolution process, the first question in a parliament without HDP will be the “rulership” matter. In other words, in what way will a strong single party steer? The biggest issue we are facing is the possibility of an unbalanced, uncontrolled presidential system.
As for the second question in a parliament without HDP; how will the politics be shaped, balanced or unbalanced, or, shared or not shared, towards a constitutional preparation especially within a single party?
There can be positive and negative results of these possibilities.
How?
In another article...
